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The goal of Thorndike’s book is to start a conversation about the transition between the a 
priori/pure/necessary parts of Kant’s philosophy and its empirical/applied/contingent parts and the 
forms such a transition can take. He closes his book with the claim that if he managed to “have 
convinced the reader of the necessity of a Transition Project, this book has reached its goal” (242). 
This goal, I believe, he accomplishes. Moreover, Thorndike’s book is much richer than what he 
himself indicates here. Apart from establishing that Kant’s metaphysics and ethics require a 
transition, Thorndike’s book also enhances our understanding of many elements of Kant’s 
philosophy that are intimately linked to the contentious relation between a priori laws and concrete 
cases. 
Thorndike’s main point is that just as Kant believes that there must be a transition from the 
most abstract and a priori principles of physics to its applied and empirical parts, there must also 
be a transition in ethics. There can be no proper philosophical system without bridging the gap 
between the a priori and the empirical. Thorndike’s main idea is to exploit the “hitherto 
unacknowledged parallel between Kant’s late writings on practical philosophy and the Opus 
postumum” (1) in order to gain a better understanding of the transition project. In the first third of 
his book, he argues that from the very beginning of his critical project Kant was aware of the need 
for a transition between a priori laws of physics and the empirical aspects of natural science. In his 
late Opus postumum, Kant tries to make good on this desideratum. He is here “searching for an 
elementary system of mediating concepts that demonstrates the systematicity of physics as a 
science” (93). These mediating concepts are the schemata, which are not empirically derived but 
stem from our judgement and they are necessary preconditions for the empirical determination of 
matter. It is ultimately the rational structures of our judgements that are supposed to afford the 
transition.  
In the second part of his book, Thorndike turns to Kant’s ethics. Grounding duty in 
autonomy, a structure that precedes everything contingent and empirical, raises the question of 
how we can determine our practical judgement in concrete cases. Thorndike believes that agents 
can only distinguish their agency from physical causation if they have organized their maxims into 
a complete system. If our maxims would not reach all the way down to specific actions then our 
agency would break down for these cases, and we could not understand ourselves as the author of 
our actions anymore. Now, even if we are sceptical of the idea that every concrete case must be 
exhaustively determined by our system of maxims (as I am, see below), we can still see why we 
would need a transition in ethics. After all, we certainly do want it to be the case that Kant’s 
abstract principles can be applied to at least some concrete cases, such as to those cases about 
which we have clear intuitions that we expect can be grounded in a priori principles as well as to 
difficult cases that we hope can be tackled better with the help of ethical theory. 
Once more, judgement takes centre stage for the transition. That judgement is the bridge 
between abstract principles and specific cases is of course unsurprising, but the way Thorndike 
spells this out is highly innovative. According to Thorndike, the parallel to the (attempted) 
transition in the Opus postumum suggests that we find the schemata that can afford a transition in 
ethics in section XII of the Doctrine of Virtue’s Introduction. This section’s aesthetic concepts 
should be understood as mediating concepts between the a priori and the empirical. This proposal 
differs notably from the two most common interpretations of the aesthetic concepts that ascribe to 
them either a motivational or an epistemic function. One particularly interesting and provocative 
upshot of Thorndike’s reading of the aesthetic concepts is that it requires us to rethink the status 
of feeling in Kant. According to Thorndike, moral concepts and feelings are absolutely central to 
human moral agency. They are the way in which agency is present to us: “Lack of affective attitude 
indicates lack of moral commitment, because moral feelings are necessary expressions of moral 
maxims. […] The cold-hearted ‘benefactor’ who merely complies with the letter of the law fails 
morally because he does not act from duty” (209). 
The third part of Thorndike’s book is dedicated to discussing how the four aesthetic 
concepts can serve to accomplish the transition. Thorndike stresses that the aesthetic concepts are 
both empirical and noumenal and connect the noumenal and phenomenal sides of the human being. 
Their function becomes most apparent in Thorndike’s discussion of benevolence, which “can be 
seen as a bridge figure between the impartiality of autonomy and the partiality of empirically 
situated agents” (197). It is noteworthy that whilst on Thorndike’s reading benevolence and the 
other aesthetic concepts help us understand how an impartial abstract principles and partial role 
obligations can be mediated, it remained unclear to me which, if any, room this would leave for 
partiality to myself. The examples Thorndike gives concern special regard for people near and dear 
to me or people I share a history with. It is not clear that this would ever leave me any room to 
pursue my personal goals at the expense of role obligations. Our pursuits might thus be wholly 
exhausted by moral obligations.  
Thorndike closes his book on a critical note: “Kant’s attempts to systematically link the 
mediating concepts to the table of the categories remain mere stipulations in the time period of 
1796–8. Kant fails to show how particular schemata are connected to the various categories or 
classes of categories. […] The 1796–8 Transition Project thus fails” (241). This comes somewhat 
as a surprise for the reader, since Thorndike’s discussion throughout the book was very 
sympathetic to Kant, though he closed his discussion of the transition in physics on a similarly 
critical note (109). It would have been good to do more to prepare this aporia throughout the book. 
In particular, I was left wondering whether Thorndike, as someone who has obviously carefully 
thought through the problems of a transition, has suggestions on how to improve on Kant’s project 
and maybe save him. Thorndike’s book is clearly intended to start a discussion about the transition 
project, and he succeeds at this. It is not intended to settle the debate about the specific form of 
such a transition. 
 
Thorndike brings very different themes of Kant’s philosophy into fruitful dialogue with each other 
and he makes valuable contributions to a number of pressing issues. Yet, let me make a critical 
remark. Whilst Thorndike could maintain that his project is purely scholarly and that he merely 
intends to faithfully represent and explain Kant’s view, I do think that the conception of agency he 
attributes to Kant should give us pause, even though Thorndike provides textual and historical 
evidence to back up his interpretation. It is unclear how moralistic this conception is. Thorndike 
expresses sympathy for a version of Hill’s latitudinarianism: Morality is; “at the empirical level”, 
determined “by an agent’s local web of maxims, which takes into account the kind of relationships 
we are committed to, the needs and interests of those with whom we engage, our own capacities, 
and so on” (214), and we can, within limits, decide freely between moral and non-moral options 
as long as we have a “reason for foregoing or not foregoing an opportunity to act on a morally 
required end” (ibid.). However, Thorndike also believes that, “for Kant, what determines the 
content of maxims must ultimately be a moral concern” (216) and that “striving for moral 
perfection and supporting the happiness of others are the two constitutive metaphysical first 
principles of what it means to be an autonomous agent” (230). 
It seems that Thorndike does want to side with a version of latitudinarianism, but his own 
systematicity does not allow for this. For him, the guide for judgement is morality. This makes it 
very difficult to understand how on this framework morality could be anything but all-consuming. 
Do obligatory ends always win out over personal (non-moral) projects, and, if not, what story has 
Kant to tell about the status of our personal ends? The issue of agency and moralism, and the role 
of our personal (non-moral) projects would be a fruitful venue for further enquiry. It would 
particularly be interesting to work out whether the conception of agency Thorndike finds in Kant 
can be attractive for Kantian ethics or should rather give us pause to endorse Kant wholeheartedly. 
 
Thorndike’s book displays impressive scholarly engagement and offers a breadth of material: from 
Kant’s pre-critical to very late phases, to his intellectual surroundings, such as Wolffian 
philosophia naturalis and Newtonian physics, Stoic ethics, Kant’s letter exchanges, etc. It is 
clearly the result of many years of deep and serious engagement with the material. It does cast a 
fresh light on many central and controversial issues such as Kant’s alleged rigorism, the worry that 
a formal principle cannot be action guiding, etc. This book deserves a wide reception among Kant 
scholars. One very interesting and important follow-up project would be to work out whether a 
transition project, based on the clues Thorndike gives us, could be made to work at all on Kant’s 
framework. 
